{"id":14,"date":"2017-10-06T07:52:01","date_gmt":"2017-10-06T07:52:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/?page_id=14"},"modified":"2017-10-10T12:47:21","modified_gmt":"2017-10-10T12:47:21","slug":"reviews","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/?page_id=14","title":{"rendered":"Mathematical Reviews"},"content":{"rendered":"
    \n
  1. J. H\u00f6rner, S. Takahashi, N Vieille (2014): On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games.\u00a0GEB<\/em>\u00a085, 70-83.<\/span><\/li>\n
  2. A. Neyman (2013): Stochastic\u00a0games with short-stage duration.\u00a0Dyn. Games Appl.<\/em>\u00a03: 236-278.<\/span><\/li>\n
  3. T. Radzik, T. Driessen (2013): On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value,\u00a0Math. Social Sci<\/em>. 65: 105-111.<\/span><\/li>\n
  4. R. Iijima (2012): On delayed discrete evolutionary dynamics.\u00a0J. Theoret. Biol<\/em>. 300: 1-6.<\/span><\/li>\n
  5. M. G\u00f3mez-R\u00faa, J. Vidal-Puga (2011): Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation.\u00a0TOP\u00a019, 167-176.<\/span><\/li>\n
  6. J. Bergin, D. Bernhardt (2009): Cooperation through imitation.\u00a0GEB\u00a067, 376-388.<\/span><\/li>\n
  7. S.C. Kontogiannis, P.G. Spirakis (2009): On the support size of stable strategies in random games.\u00a0Theor. Comp. Sci.<\/i>\u00a0410: 933-942.<\/span><\/li>\n
  8. K. Takamiya (2009): Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities.\u00a0J. Math. Econom.<\/i>\u00a045, 199-204.<\/span><\/li>\n
  9. M. Grabisch, P. Miranda (2008): On the vertices of the\u00a0k<\/i>-additive core.\u00a0Discrete Math.<\/i>308, 5204-5217.<\/span><\/li>\n
  10. A. Zimper (2007): A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a036, 107-117.<\/span><\/li>\n
  11. F. Llerena, C. Rafels (2007): Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and D-core.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a035, 603-615.<\/span><\/li>\n
  12. F. Carreras (2007): Automorphisms and blocking in simple games. In:\u00a0Discrete Appl. Math.<\/i>\u00a0155, 496-505.<\/span><\/li>\n
  13. A.A. Vasin (2006): The Folk theorems in the framework of evolution and cooperation. In:\u00a0Advances in Dynamic Games 8<\/i>, Birkh\u00e4user, 197-207.<\/span><\/li>\n
  14. M. Slikker (2006): A characterization of the position value.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a033, 505-514.<\/span><\/li>\n
  15. F. Llerena, C. Rafels (2006): The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a054, 273-379.<\/span><\/li>\n
  16. E.R. Smol\u2019yakov (2005): Axiomatization in cooperative game theory.\u00a0Computational Mathematics and Modeling\u00a0<\/i>16, 60-71.<\/span><\/li>\n
  17. S. Fl\u00e5m, G. Owen, M. Saboy\u00e1 (2005): The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games.\u00a0Math. Soc. Sci<\/i>.<\/i>\u00a050, 279-297.<\/span><\/li>\n
  18. J. Timmer, P. Borm, S. Tijs (2005): Convexity in stochastic cooperative situations.\u00a0IGTR<\/i>\u00a07, 25-42.<\/span><\/li>\n
  19. L.A. Petrosyan, E.M. Baranova, E.V. Shevkoplyas (2004): Multistage cooperative games with random duration.\u00a0Proc. Steklov Inst. Math.<\/i>\u00a02004,\u00a0Mathematical Control Theory, Differential Games<\/i>, 126-141.<\/span><\/li>\n
  20. E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao. J.R. Fern\u00e1ndez, A. Jim\u00e9nez (2004): The Lovasz extension of market games.\u00a0Theory and Decision<\/i>\u00a056, 229-238.<\/span><\/li>\n
  21. C.-R. Hsiao (2004): The power indices for multi-choice multi-values games.\u00a0Taiwanese J. Math.<\/i>\u00a08, 259-270.<\/span><\/li>\n
  22. D. Rosenberg,\u00a0E.<\/a>\u00a0Solan, N. Vieille (2003): The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a032, 133-150.<\/span><\/li>\n
  23. J. Vidal-Puga, G. Bergantinos (2003): An implementation of the Owen value.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a044, 412-427.<\/span><\/li>\n
  24. G. Haeringer (2002): On the stability of cooperation structures.\u00a0ICM<\/i>2002GTA<\/i>, Qingdao Publ. House, Qingdao, 207-223.<\/span><\/li>\n
  25. N. Anthonissen (2002): On learning to cooperate.\u00a0JET<\/i>\u00a0107, 253-287.<\/span><\/li>\n
  26. J.M.\u00a0Bilbao, T.S.H. Driessen, A. Jim\u00e9nz-Losada, E. L\u00e9bron (2002): The Shapley value for games on matroids: the dynamic model.\u00a0Math. Methods Oper. Res.<\/em><\/a>\u00a056,\u00a0<\/strong>87–301.<\/span><\/li>\n
  27. G.B. Asheim (2002): On the epistemic foundation for backward induction.\u00a0Math. Soc. Sci<\/i>. 44, 121-144.<\/span><\/li>\n
  28. J. Arin, V. Feltkamp (2002): Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: the weighted coalitional Lorenz solutions.\u00a0Soc. Choice Welf<\/i>.\u00a0<\/i>19, 869-884.<\/span><\/li>\n
  29. E. Yanovskaya (2002): A family of the least power values for cooperative TU games.\u00a0Lecture Notes in Econom. And Math. Systems\u00a0<\/i>510, Springer, Berlin.<\/span><\/li>\n
  30. I. Auriol, E. Marchi (2002): Quasi-assignment cooperative games.\u00a0IGTR<\/i>\u00a04, 173-182.<\/span><\/li>\n
  31. J. Arin, E. Inarra (2001) Egalitarian solutions in the core.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a030, 187-193.<\/span><\/li>\n
  32. P. Borm, A. De Waegenaere, C. Rafels, J. Suijs, S. Tijs, J. Timmer (2001) Cooperation in capital deposits.\u00a0OR Spektrum<\/i>\u00a023, 265-281.<\/span><\/li>\n
  33. C. Chang, Y.A. Hwang (2001): Closedness under Hart-Mas Colell reduction.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a030, 351-357.<\/span><\/li>\n
  34. C. Chang, Y.A. Hwang (2001): Some results related to the Harsanyi-Shapley solution.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a030, 247-258.<\/span><\/li>\n
  35. I.V. Evstigneev, S.D. Flam (2001): Sharing non-convex costs.\u00a0J. Global Optim.<\/i>\u00a020, 257-271.<\/span><\/li>\n
  36. F. Forges, E. Minelli (2001): A note on the incentive compatible core.\u00a0JET<\/i>\u00a098, 179-188.<\/span><\/li>\n
  37. Y. Funaki, T. Yamato (2001): The core and consistency properties: a general characterisation.\u00a0\u00a0IGTR<\/i>\u00a03, 175-187.<\/span><\/li>\n
  38. J.Y. Halpern (2001): Substantive rationality and backward induction.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a037, 425-435.<\/span><\/li>\n
  39. A. Kovalenkov, M. Holtz-Wooders (2001): An exact bound for non-emptiness of epsilon cores of games.\u00a0MOR<\/i>\u00a026, 654-678.<\/span><\/li>\n
  40. A. Kovalenkov, M. Holtz-Wooders (2001): Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments: non-emptiness and equal treatment.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a036, 193-218.<\/span><\/li>\n
  41. A. Stefanescu (2001): On the structure of the core of balanced games.\u00a0Kybernetika<\/i>\u00a037, 39-46.<\/span><\/li>\n
  42. E. Calvo, J.C. Santos (2000): Weigted weak semivalues.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a029, 1-9.<\/span><\/li>\n
  43. J.M. Bilbao, E. Lebr\u00f3n, N. Jim\u00e9nez (2000): Simple games on closure spaces.\u00a0Top<\/i>\u00a08, 43-55.<\/span><\/li>\n
  44. J.M. Ettinger (2000): A metric for positional games.\u00a0Theoret. Comput. Sci.<\/i>\u00a0230, 207-219.<\/span><\/li>\n
  45. T. Mariotti (2000): Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information.\u00a0J. Math. Econom.<\/em><\/a>\u00a034,\u00a0<\/strong>9-128.<\/span><\/li>\n
  46. O. Gossner (2000): Comparison of information structures.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a030, 44-63.<\/span><\/li>\n
  47. N.N. Vorobev, A.N. Liapounov (2000): The proper Shapley value.\u00a0Int. J. of Math.,Game Theory, and Algebra<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>10, 115-120.<\/span><\/li>\n
  48. J.R.G. van Gellekom, J.A.M. Potters, J.H. Reijnierse (1999): Prosperity properties of TU-games.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a0\u00a028, 211-227.<\/span><\/li>\n
  49. G. Hamiache (1999): A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures.\u00a0Math. Social Sci.<\/i>\u00a037, 281-305.<\/span><\/li>\n
  50. L.K. Raut (1999): Aumann-Shapley random order values of non-atomic games.\u00a0Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory<\/i>,\u00a0Fields Inst. Commun.<\/i>\u00a023, 121-136.<\/span><\/li>\n
  51. J. Suijs, P. Borm (1999): Stochastic cooperative games: superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a027, 331-345.<\/span><\/li>\n
  52. M. Voorneveld, P. Borm, F. Van Megen, S. Tijs (1999): Congestion games and potentials reconsidered.\u00a0IGTR<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>1, 283-299.<\/span><\/li>\n
  53. T.S.H. Driessen (1998): A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a027, 301-303.<\/span><\/li>\n
  54. G. van der Laan, R. van den Brink (1998): Axiomatization of a class of share functions for\u00a0N-person games.\u00a0Theory and Decision<\/i>\u00a044, 117-148.<\/span><\/li>\n
  55. E. Lehrer, S. Sorin (1998): \u03b5-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a027, 231-244.<\/span><\/li>\n
  56. E. Boros, V. Gurvich, A. Vasin (1997): Stable families of coalitions and norml hypergraphs.\u00a0Math. Social Sci.<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>34, 107-123.<\/span><\/li>\n
  57. R.B. Myerson (1997): Dual reduction and elementary games.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a021, 183-202.<\/span><\/li>\n
  58. P. Battigalli (1996): Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria.\u00a0JET<\/i>\u00a070, 210-234.<\/span><\/li>\n
  59. E. Calvo, E. Guti\u00e9rerez (1996): A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties.\u00a0Top<\/i>\u00a04, 257-267.<\/span><\/li>\n
  60. I. Dragan (1996): On some relationships between the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value.\u00a0Lib. Math<\/i>.\u00a016, 31-42.<\/span><\/li>\n
  61. T. Radzik, A. Wieczorek (1996): Measuring initiative and attraction by means of deviations from the Shapley value.\u00a0Optimization<\/i>\u00a036, 167-180.<\/span><\/li>\n
  62. A.A. Vasin, V.A. Gurvich (1996): On the existence of the coalition set core.\u00a0Int. J. of Math.,Game Theory, and Algebra<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>5, 375-382.<\/span><\/li>\n
  63. N. Vieille (1996): Conditional systems revisited.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a025, 207-217.<\/span><\/li>\n
  64. V. Feltkamp (1995): Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>24, 179-186.<\/span><\/li>\n
  65. O. Gossner (1995): The Folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>24, 95-107.<\/span><\/li>\n
  66. F. Grafe, A. Mauleon, E. I\u00f1arra (1995): A simple procedure to compute the nucleolus of \u0393-component additive games.\u00a0Top<\/i>\u00a03, 235-245.<\/span><\/li>\n
  67. T. Ichiishi (1995): Cooperative processing of information.\u00a0Nonlinear and Convex Analysis in Economic Theory<\/i>\u00a0(Tokyo, 1993),\u00a0Lecture Notes in Econ. and Math. Systems<\/i>\u00a0419, Springer, Berlin, 101-117.<\/span><\/li>\n
  68. G. Olcina, A. Urbano (1994): Introspection and equilibrium selection in 2H2 matrix games.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a023, 183-206.<\/span><\/li>\n
  69. G. Orshan (1993): The consistent Shapley value in hyperplane games from a global stand\u00adpoint.\u00a0IJGT<\/i>\u00a021, 1-11.<\/span><\/li>\n
  70. J.C. Harsanyi (1992): Game solutions and the normal form. In:\u00a0Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge Stud. Prob. Induc. Decis. Theory<\/i>, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 355-376.<\/span><\/li>\n
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  72. J. Zhao (1992): The hybrid solutions of an\u00a0n-person game.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a0<\/i>4, 145-160.<\/span><\/li>\n
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  74. Y. Chun (1989): A new axiomatization of the Shapley value.\u00a0GEB<\/i>\u00a01, 119-130.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    J. H\u00f6rner, S. Takahashi, N Vieille (2014): On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games.\u00a0GEB\u00a085, 70-83. A. Neyman (2013): Stochastic\u00a0games with short-stage duration.\u00a0Dyn. Games Appl.\u00a03: 236-278. T. Radzik, T. Driessen (2013): On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value,\u00a0Math. Social Sci. 65: 105-111. R. Iijima (2012): On … Continue reading Mathematical Reviews<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-14","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=14"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":86,"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14\/revisions\/86"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dke.maastrichtuniversity.nl\/f.thuijsman\/site\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=14"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}