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Reviews written for Mathematical Reviews
  1. J. Hörner, S. Takahashi, N Vieille (2014): On the limit perfect public equilibrium payoff set in repeated and stochastic games. GEB 85, 70-83.
  2. A. Neyman (2013): Stochastic games with short-stage duration. Dyn. Games Appl. 3: 236-278.
  3. T. Radzik, T. Driessen (2013): On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value, Math. Social Sci. 65: 105-111.
  4. R. Iijima (2012): On delayed discrete evolutionary dynamics. J. Theoret. Biol. 300: 1-6.
  5. M. Gómez-Rúa, J. Vidal-Puga (2011): Balanced per capita contributions and level structure of cooperation. TOP 19, 167-176.
  6. J. Bergin, D. Bernhardt (2009): Cooperation through imitation. GEB 67, 376-388.
  7. S.C. Kontogiannis, P.G. Spirakis (2009): On the support size of stable strategies in random games. Theor. Comp. Sci. 410: 933-942.
  8. K. Takamiya (2009): Preference revelation games and strong cores of allocation problems with indivisibilities. J. Math. Econom. 45, 199-204.
  9. M. Grabisch, P. Miranda (2008): On the vertices of the k-additive core. Discrete Math.308, 5204-5217.
  10. A. Zimper (2007): A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes. IJGT 36, 107-117.
  11. F. Llerena, C. Rafels (2007): Convex decomposition of games and axiomatizations of the core and D-core. IJGT 35, 603-615.
  12. F. Carreras (2007): Automorphisms and blocking in simple games. In: Discrete Appl. Math. 155, 496-505.
  13. A.A. Vasin (2006): The Folk theorems in the framework of evolution and cooperation. In: Advances in Dynamic Games 8, Birkhäuser, 197-207.
  14. M. Slikker (2006): A characterization of the position value. IJGT 33, 505-514.
  15. F. Llerena, C. Rafels (2006): The vector lattice structure of the n-person TU games. GEB 54, 273-379.
  16. E.R. Smol’yakov (2005): Axiomatization in cooperative game theory. Computational Mathematics and Modeling 16, 60-71.
  17. S. Flåm, G. Owen, M. Saboyá (2005): The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games. Math. Soc. Sci. 50, 279-297. 
  18. J. Timmer, P. Borm, S. Tijs (2005): Convexity in stochastic cooperative situations. IGTR 7, 25-42.
  19. L.A. Petrosyan, E.M. Baranova, E.V. Shevkoplyas (2004): Multistage cooperative games with random duration. Proc. Steklov Inst. Math. 2004, Mathematical Control Theory, Differential Games, 126-141.
  20. E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao. J.R. Fernández, A. Jiménez (2004): The Lovasz extension of market games. Theory and Decision 56, 229-238.
  21. C.-R. Hsiao (2004): The power indices for multi-choice multi-values games. Taiwanese J. Math. 8, 259-270.
  22. D. Rosenberg, E. Solan, N. Vieille (2003): The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring. IJGT 32, 133-150.
  23. J. Vidal-Puga, G. Bergantinos (2003): An implementation of the Owen value. GEB 44, 412-427.
  24. G. Haeringer (2002): On the stability of cooperation structures. ICM2002GTA, Qingdao Publ. House, Qingdao, 207-223.
  25. N. Anthonissen (2002): On learning to cooperate. JET 107, 253-287.
  26. J.M. Bilbao, T.S.H. Driessen, A. Jiménz-Losada, E. Lébron (2002): The Shapley value for games on matroids: the dynamic model. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 56, 87--301.
  27. G.B. Asheim (2002): On the epistemic foundation for backward induction. Math. Soc. Sci. 44, 121-144. 
  28. J. Arin, V. Feltkamp (2002): Lorenz undominated allocations for TU-games: the weighted coalitional Lorenz solutions. Soc. Choice Welf. 19, 869-884.
  29. E. Yanovskaya (2002): A family of the least power values for cooperative TU games. Lecture Notes in Econom. And Math. Systems 510, Springer, Berlin.
  30. I. Auriol, E. Marchi (2002): Quasi-assignment cooperative games. IGTR 4, 173-182.
  31. J. Arin, E. Inarra (2001) Egalitarian solutions in the core. IJGT 30, 187-193.
  32. P. Borm, A. De Waegenaere, C. Rafels, J. Suijs, S. Tijs, J. Timmer (2001) Cooperation in capital deposits. OR Spektrum 23, 265-281.
  33. C. Chang, Y.A. Hwang (2001): Closedness under Hart-Mas Colell reduction. IJGT 30, 351-357.
  34. C. Chang, Y.A. Hwang (2001): Some results related to the Harsanyi-Shapley solution. IJGT 30, 247-258.
  35. I.V. Evstigneev, S.D. Flam (2001): Sharing non-convex costs. J. Global Optim. 20, 257-271.
  36. F. Forges, E. Minelli (2001): A note on the incentive compatible core. JET 98, 179-188.
  37. Y. Funaki, T. Yamato (2001): The core and consistency properties: a general characterisation.  IGTR 3, 175-187.
  38. J.Y. Halpern (2001): Substantive rationality and backward induction. GEB 37, 425-435.
  39. A. Kovalenkov, M. Holtz-Wooders (2001): An exact bound for non-emptiness of epsilon cores of games. MOR 26, 654-678.
  40. A. Kovalenkov, M. Holtz-Wooders (2001): Epsilon cores of games with limited side payments: non-emptiness and equal treatment. GEB 36, 193-218.
  41. A. Stefanescu (2001): On the structure of the core of balanced games. Kybernetika 37, 39-46.
  42. E. Calvo, J.C. Santos (2000): Weigted weak semivalues. IJGT 29, 1-9.
  43. J.M. Bilbao, E. Lebrón, N. Jiménez (2000): Simple games on closure spaces. Top 8, 43-55.
  44. J.M. Ettinger (2000): A metric for positional games. Theoret. Comput. Sci. 230, 207-219.
  45. T. Mariotti (2000): Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information. J. Math. Econom. 34, 9-128.
  46. O. Gossner (2000): Comparison of information structures. GEB 30, 44-63.
  47. N.N. Vorobev, A.N. Liapounov (2000): The proper Shapley value. Int. J. of Math.,Game Theory, and Algebra 10, 115-120.
  48. J.R.G. van Gellekom, J.A.M. Potters, J.H. Reijnierse (1999): Prosperity properties of TU-games. IJGT  28, 211-227.
  49. G. Hamiache (1999): A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures. Math. Social Sci. 37, 281-305.
  50. L.K. Raut (1999): Aumann-Shapley random order values of non-atomic games. Topics in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Fields Inst. Commun. 23, 121-136.
  51. J. Suijs, P. Borm (1999): Stochastic cooperative games: superadditivity, convexity, and certainty equivalents. GEB 27, 331-345.
  52. M. Voorneveld, P. Borm, F. Van Megen, S. Tijs (1999): Congestion games and potentials reconsidered. IGTR 1, 283-299.
  53. T.S.H. Driessen (1998): A note on the inclusion of the kernel in the core of the bilateral assignment game. IJGT 27, 301-303.
  54. G. van der Laan, R. van den Brink (1998): Axiomatization of a class of share functions for N-person games. Theory and Decision 44, 117-148.
  55. E. Lehrer, S. Sorin (1998): ε-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games. IJGT 27, 231-244.
  56. E. Boros, V. Gurvich, A. Vasin (1997): Stable families of coalitions and norml hypergraphs. Math. Social Sci. 34, 107-123.
  57. R.B. Myerson (1997): Dual reduction and elementary games. GEB 21, 183-202.
  58. P. Battigalli (1996): Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria. JET 70, 210-234.
  59. E. Calvo, E. Gutiérerez (1996): A prekernel characterization by means of stability properties. Top 4, 257-267.
  60. I. Dragan (1996): On some relationships between the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value. Lib. Math. 16, 31-42.
  61. T. Radzik, A. Wieczorek (1996): Measuring initiative and attraction by means of deviations from the Shapley value. Optimization 36, 167-180.
  62. A.A. Vasin, V.A. Gurvich (1996): On the existence of the coalition set core. Int. J. of Math.,Game Theory, and Algebra 5, 375-382.
  63. N. Vieille (1996): Conditional systems revisited. IJGT 25, 207-217.
  64. V. Feltkamp (1995): Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values. IJGT 24, 179-186.
  65. O. Gossner (1995): The Folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies. IJGT 24, 95-107.
  66. F. Grafe, A. Mauleon, E. Iñarra (1995): A simple procedure to compute the nucleolus of Γ-component additive games. Top 3, 235-245.
  67. T. Ichiishi (1995): Cooperative processing of information. Nonlinear and Convex Analysis in Economic Theory (Tokyo, 1993), Lecture Notes in Econ. and Math. Systems 419, Springer, Berlin, 101-117.
  68. G. Olcina, A. Urbano (1994): Introspection and equilibrium selection in 2H2 matrix games. IJGT 23, 183-206.
  69. G. Orshan (1993): The consistent Shapley value in hyperplane games from a global stand­point. IJGT 21, 1-11.
  70. J.C. Harsanyi (1992): Game solutions and the normal form. In: Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge Stud. Prob. Induc. Decis. Theory, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 355-376.
  71. C.-R. Hsiao, T.E.S. Raghavan (1992): Multi-choice cooperative games. In: Game Theory and Economic Applications, Lecture Notes in Econ. and Math. Systems 389, Springer, Berlin, 170-188.
  72. J. Zhao (1992): The hybrid solutions of an n-person game. GEB 4, 145-160.
  73. F. Carreras (1991): Restriction of simple games. Math. Soc. Sci. 21, 245-260.
  74. Y. Chun (1989): A new axiomatization of the Shapley value. GEB 1, 119-130.